Kredyty we frankach zaproszeniem do dyskusji o prawie bankowym

"Kredyty we frankach są najważniejszym problemem dla Polski. Takie wrażenie może odebrać obcokrajowiec, gdyby znał polski i obserwował pilnie to, co pojawia się w naszych mediach i co mówią nasi politycy. Problem w tym, że (z mojej obserwacji można wysnuć taki wniosek), że politycy i ludzie mediów są najbardziej zadłużeni we frankach. Prawdę mówiąc każdy, kto mówi o kredytach walutowych powinien informować, czy jest zadłużony we frankach (ja nie jestem i nigdy nie byłem)."

http://kuczynski.blogbank.pl/2015/02/09/kredyty-we-frankach-zaproszeniem-do-dyskusji-o-prawie-bankowym/

Zapraszam do zapoznania się ze zdaniem Pana Piotra Kuczyńskiego - trzeźwe spojrzenie + zwrócenie uwagi na prawdziwe problemy. Polecam.

Nie będzie żadnego frankogeddonu

"Mając na uwadze, atak mediów i żerowanie na emocjach przez media chciałbym uspokoić - nie będzie żadnego frankogeddonu.

Temat kredytów hipotecznych we franku i problemów z nimi związanych nie jest nowy. Pojawił się już parę lat temu, kiedy dokonało się pierwsze duże umocnienie franka. Pisałem o ekspozycji walutowej poszczególnych banków w Polsce. Dzisiaj zajrzałem do wpisów i widzę że nawet lista banków się nie zmieniła, tylko ewentualnie nastąpiła konsolidacja i połączenia po drodze (np duży oferent franków grecki Polbank został kupiony przez austriacki Raiffeisen, lub PKO BP kupił Nordea)."

http://stojeipatrze.blogspot.com/2015/01/nie-bedzie-zadnego-frankogeddonu.html

Asset Quality Review czyli czego boi się Europa?

"Otóż EBC sprawdza, co kryje się w aktywach największych banków strefy euro i czy przypadkiem nie dochodzi w nich do zaniżania wag ryzyka a przez to zawyżania współczynników wypłacalności i fałszowania obrazu kondycji całego sektora bankowego w Europie. Bankom zależy na tym, aby na papierze ryzyko przez nie podejmowane było jak najmniejsze, z uwagi na wymogi kapitałowe stawiane im przez regulacje Basel III/CRR/CRD IV. Zasada generalna jest następująca: im bardziej ryzykowne aktywa są w bilansie banku, tym więcej kapitału własnego dany bank powinien posiadać, aby zamortyzować ewentualny default ferelnego aktywa."

http://wykresologia.blogspot.com/2014/10/asset-quality-review-czyli-czego-boi.html

How to rip off a bank, Espirito Santo style

"I have been going through Banco Espírito Santo's half-year 2014 results. They make pretty grim reading. No, actually it's worse than that. They read like an instruction manual on how to rip off a bank.

I can't work out if the BES management at the time was stupid, naïve, complacent or criminal. Probably all four. No matter – it has now been entirely replaced. Well, I say “no matter” - but actually such abysmal management DOES matter. Those responsible for audit, risk and compliance have been guilty of incompetence so gross it borders on the criminal. And the former CEO and vice-chairman, Ricardo Espírito Santo Salgardo – a member of the Espírito Santo family – has been arrested on suspicion of money laundering and tax evasion. But I suspect he has done more than that: he was also chairman of ESFG, which – as will become apparent shortly – systematically drained the bank and its other subsidiaries. If he didn't know what was going on, he was incompetent: if he did, then he was a party to corruption and fraud on a simply massive scale. Exactly how massive is not yet clear. But I think we are talking billions of Euros."

http://www.pieria.co.uk/articles/how_to_rip_off_a_bank_esprito_santo_style

Creeping nationalisation

"Commercial banks are slowly dying. The activities that were formerly profitable are either illegal, immoral or simply not profitable any more. And the core activities that society wants and needs are also unprofitable, at least if they are done in the way that society has come to expect – free-while-in-credit transaction accounts, inflation-level interest on deposits, fixed low margins on lending. Meanwhile, commercial banks face stiff competition from new competitors – not new banks, though there are some of these, mostly backed by large retail organisations – but an astonishing and ever-increasing range of mostly internet or phone-based providers of deposit-taking, lending and payments services. Unlike the new providers, banks are having to meet higher capital and liquidity requirements and comply with tighter regulations, while suffering margin squeeze because of low interest rates and a continual drain of dissatisfied customers. And they are still facing legal costs and fines for their past misbehaviour. It's a very tough world for banks at the moment.

And they are paying the price. The big investment banks are already breaking themselves up, and they will be followed in due course by the big universal and retail banks. What has not been achieved through regulation may yet be achieved through market forces."

http://coppolacomment.blogspot.com/2014/07/creeping-nationalisation.html

BRICS’ new financial institutions could undermine US-EU global dominance

"During the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, when middle-income countries were hard hit by big capital outflows, there was an effort by China, Japan, Taiwan and other countries to put together an Asian Monetary Fund to offer balance of payments support. Washington vetoed the idea, insisting that all assistance had to go through the International Monetary Fund. The result was a mess, including an unnecessarily deep regional recession, as the IMF failed to act as a lender of last resort and then attached all kinds of harmful and unnecessary conditions to its lending.

But the world has changed a lot in the past 15 years. Last week the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) decided to form the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and the New Development Bank (NDB), and the United States will not have a veto this time. These new institutions could mark a turning point for the international financial system."

http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/brics-developmentbankimffinance.html

Deutsche Bank's Latest Capital Raising Won't End Its Problems

"Deutsche Bank has finally admitted – to no-one’s surprise – that it needs more capital. It has announced plans to raise 8bn EUR of new Core Tier 1 equity capital (CET1).

Although everyone knew Deutsche Bank was short of capital, this admission is nevertheless somewhat embarrassing. Only last year, Deutsche Bank raised 3bn EUR with a rights issue and claimed that no further capital would be needed."

"To me, Deutsche Bank looks very much like the archetypal “too big to fail” zombie bank – draining money from central banks, sovereigns and investors while giving little in the way of returns. The question is for how long investors will be willing to put up with poor returns and repeated demands for more money – for if anyone thinks this is the last of Deutsche Bank’s capital raising, I fear they are very much mistaken. Though admittedly it is far from being the only European bank in this condition. European banks generally are in poor shape. It is to be hoped that the ECB’s stress tests will encourage them to put their houses in order."

http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2014/05/19/deutsche-banks-latest-capital-raising-wont-end-its-problems/

Orange i mBank wspólnie zbudują nowy bank. Oby nie wyszło im to za dobrze ;-)

"Jeśli jest prawdą hipoteza, że strategiczne sojusze firm telekomunikacyjnych z bankami ustalą na długie lata nowy układ sił w branży finansowej, to właśnie jesteśmy świadkami najważniejszego momentu w tej grze. mBank, trzeci największy bank w Polsce, poinformował w poniedziałek wieczorem o strategicznym porozumieniu z koncernem Orange, z którego usług korzysta ponad 15 mln Polaków. Umowa przewiduje, że w drugiej połowie roku partnerzy powołają wspólnie bank, który będzie oferował specjalnie sprofilowane usługi klientom Orange."

" Wiedza o terminowości opłacania i wysokości rachunku za telefon jest jedną z najważniejszych w ocenie zdolności kredytowej klienta (bo każdy kto ma kłopoty finansowe najpierw przestaje płacić za telefon). Otwiera się też gigantyczne pole do współpracy na niwie Big Data. Wiedza, jaką mają operatorzy telekomunikacyjni na temat naszego życia, jest niemała. Wiedzą którymi ulicami chodzimy, do których sklepów zaglądamy, które centrum handlowe najbardziej lubimy oraz jak często robimy siusiu. Banki z kolei wiedzą ile zarabiamy, co kupujemy, gdzie wydajemy pieniądze."

http://samcik.blox.pl/2014/03/Orange-i-mBank-maja-strategiczny-sojusz-otworza.html

Shadow Banking Is Hurting China’s Banks — And That’s a Good Thing

"How can the world’s second-largest economy function at all? Enter shadow bankers - broadly defined as lenders outside the formal banking system. They include mom-and-pop lending operations, companies lending excess cash to each other, pawnshops, and recently tech companies running money market funds. Unlike shadow banking in the West, shadow banking in China is a necessity, helping build factories, mines, infrastructure projects, and other activities, and creating jobs."

http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2014/03/10/shadow-banking-is-hurting-chinas-banks-and-thats-a-good-thing/

Credit Value Adjustment (CVA) implementation comes of age

"In banking, particularly recently, one often hears the term “Credit Value Adjustment” or CVA. Is it a new fashion trend in the world of finance world is it there more to it? Why are traders, quants, and risk officers at large institutions feverishly trying to deal with this topic all of a sudden? It turns out that the increased focus on counterparty risk after the financial crisis as well as the new Basel requirements for bank capitalization (see document) have added urgency to the CVA implementation by international banks, forcing them to focus on the topic."

"The CVA measure is different from the concept of standard Credit Risk because it combines the uncertainty of exposure with the bilateral nature of exposure. It measures the risk that the counterparty to a financial contract will default prior to its expiration and will not make the specified payments. At the same time the amount of those specified payments may have increased due to market movements." 

http://soberlook.com/2013/10/credit-value-adjustment-cva.html

European Banks: Between a Rock (Need of More Capital) and a Hard Place (Low Profitability)

"The financial crisis has put to the forefront the long-debated issue of banks’ capital adequacy, showing that banks were much more fragile than they (and their regulators) pretended, also because they were allowed to push their leverage to levels much higher than any industrial company, or even a hedge fund, has never dreamt of."

"This column aims to discuss this issue, looking at a sample of 20 global banks, analysed by R&S, a Mediobanca subsidiary. The main conclusion is that banks have not reached a new equilibrium after the financial crisis and that, if banks really want to be more robust in the future, they must implement radical strategic changes, aiming at deleveraging through reduction of non-core assets and/or achieving substantial reduction of operating costs."

http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/02/european-banks-rock-need-capital-hard-place-low-profitability.html

The Banking Industry's Biggest Problem isn't Bonuses or Market Share

"The problem with bonuses in the financial industry is not about their levels – if someone makes a huge contribution to the economy, he or she should be richly rewarded. The main problem is that these bonuses are given to people for doing the wrong things well – things that harm the economy in order to enrich the shareholders, the top managers of banks and other financial firms.

So the real question is how we make banks and other financial firms pursue the right goals, rather than how much people should be paid, whether in bonuses or salaries. And the only way to make them pursue different goals from those they pursue now is to change the rules of the game."

http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/the-banking-industrys-biggest-problem-isnt-bonuses-or-market-share?utm_source=CEPR+feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+cepr+%28CEPR%29

Banks Don't Lend Out Reserves

"Firstly, here’s a short explanation of bank lending. Under normal circumstances, deposits and loans are more-or-less equal across the banking system as a whole. This is because when a bank creates a new loan, it also creates a new balancing deposit. It creates this “from thin air”, not from existing money: banks do not “lend out” existing deposits, as is commonly thought."

"When the Fed buys private sector assets from investors, it not only creates new deposits, it creates new reserves. This is because a new deposit (liability) in a bank must be balanced by an equivalent asset. When banks create deposits by lending, the equivalent asset is a loan. When the Fed creates deposits by buying assets, the equivalent asset is an increase in reserves, also newly created. So it does not matter how much lending banks do, if the Fed is creating new deposit/reserve pairs by buying assets from private sector investors then deposits will ALWAYS exceed loans by the amount of those new reserves."

http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2014/01/21/banks-dont-lend-out-reserves/

Customer Loyalty in Retail Banking: Global Edition 2013

Bardzo polecam przeglądnąć opracowanie od Bain & Company o zachowaniach klientów banków na całym świecie. Opracowanie zawiera masę ciekawych zestawień, przykładowo można znaleźć informację wykorzystaniu bankowości mobilnej oraz wizytach w oddziałach w rozbiciu na poszczególne kraje. Lub też znaleźć informację o motywach będących podstawą zmiany banku. (Raport w pliku pdf.)

"How exactly does customer loyalty translate into better financial results for a retail bank? And how much value is at stake? For many bankers, the link between loyalty and financial results is somewhat unclear.

This year’s report, based on Bain’s proprietary research with 190,200 consumers in 27 countries, sheds light on how banks are using (or failing to use) loyalty to improve the economics of the business. The research was conducted online in July and August 2013 through market research firms Research Now and GMI."

http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/customer-loyalty-in-retail-banking-2013.aspx

The $5 trillion dilemma facing banking regulators

"During the financial crisis, everybody became familiar with the idea that a bank could be “too interconnected to fail”. The problem arises from the way that derivatives tend to accumulate: if you have a certain position with a certain counterparty, and you want to unwind that position, then you can try to negotiate with your original counterparty — but they might not be particularly inclined to give you the best price. So instead you enter into an offsetting position with a different counterparty. You now have two derivatives positions, rather than one. The profits on one should offset any losses on the other — but your counterparty risk has doubled. As a result, total counterparty risk only ever goes up, and when a bank like Lehman Brothers fails, the entire financial system gets put at risk."

"All of which means that as we move to a system of central clearinghouses, a new systemic risk is emerging: “fire sale risk” is the term of art. If a market becomes stressed, and the clearinghouses raise their margin requirements, then the consequences can be huge. In the bond market, the death spiral is all too well known: a sovereign starts looking risky, the margin on its bonds is hiked, which in turn triggers a sell-off in that country’s bonds, which makes them seem even riskier, which triggers another margin hike, and so on."

http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/12/03/the-5-trillion-dilemma-facing-banking-regulators/

Mystery Behind Spanish Banks' Extend-And-Pretend "Bad Debt Miracle" Revealed

"One of the mysteries surrounding the insolvent, and already once bailed out Spanish banking sector, has been the question why reported bad loans - sharply rising as they may be - are still as relatively low as they are currently, considering the nation's near highest in the Eurozone unemployment rate, and in comparison to such even more insolvent European nations as Greece, Cyprus and Slovenia.

Courtesy of the just completed bank earnings season, and a WSJ report, we now know why: it turns out that for the past several years, instead of accurately designating non-performing loans, banks would constantly "refinance" bad loans making them appear viable even though banks have known full well there would be zero recoveries on those loans. In fact, as the story below describes, banks would even go so far as making additional loans whose proceeds would be just to pay interest on the existing NPLs - a morbid debt pyramid scheme, which when it collapses, no amount of EFSF, ESM or any other acronym-based bailout, will be able to make the country's irreparably damaged banks appear even remotely viable."

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-11-11/mystery-behind-spanish-banks-extend-and-pretend-npl-miracle-revealed

Shadow banking and the global financial ecosystem

"Modern banks operate in a complex global financial ecosystem. This column argues that proper regulation requires an updating of our ideas about how they operate. Modern banks finance bond portfolios with uninsured money market instruments, and thus link cash portfolio managers and risk portfolio managers. Gone are the days when banks linked ultimate borrowers with ultimate savers via loans and deposits. The Flow of Funds should be updated to reflect the new realities.

Regulatory reform has focused on banks and how much liquidity and capital they should hold, rather than on the evolution of the broader financial ecosystem that banks are only a part of. However, understanding this ecosystem is imperative, as it can influence the types of activities banks engage in and the types of liabilities they issue."

http://www.voxeu.org/article/global-financial-ecosystem-0

Hidden debt must still be repaid

"Five or six years ago, a few skeptics first started pointing out that the credit dynamics underlying Chinese growth was creating an unsustainable increase in debt. This, they warned, would ultimately undermine the banking system and cause growth to collapse if it were not addressed in time.(...)

I agree that China is in a very different position than the US, but this isn’t necessarily a good thing. The main relevant difference is that because all the banks are perceived to be guaranteed by the central government, and Chinese households have a limited number of ways to save outside the banking system, it is unlikely that China will experience a system-wide bank run as long as the credibility of the guarantee survives, and runs on individual banks can be resolved by regulatory fiat (banks that receive deposits will be forced to lend to banks that lose deposits). We are not likely to see a Lehman-style crisis."

http://blog.mpettis.com/2013/10/hidden-debt-must-still-be-repayed/

What is Shadow Banking?

"The Financial Stability Board (2012) describes shadow banking as “credit intermediation involving entities and activities (fully or partially) outside the regular banking system”. This is a useful benchmark, but has two weaknesses:
First, it may cover entities that are not commonly thought of as shadow banking, such as leasing and finance companies, credit-oriented hedge funds, corporate tax vehicles, etc. (...)
Second, it describes shadow banking activities as operating primarily outside banks."

"An alternative – ‘functional’ – approach treats shadow banking as a collection of specific intermediation services. Each of them responds to its own demand factors (e.g., demand for safe assets in securitisation, the need to efficiently use scarce collateral to support a large volume of secured transactions, etc.). The functional view offers useful insights. It stresses that shadow banking is driven not only by regulatory arbitrage, but also by genuine demand, to which intermediaries respond. This implies that in order to effectively regulate shadow banking, one should consider the demand for its services and – crucially – understand how its services are being provided (Claessens et al. 2012)."

http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/08/what-is-shadow-banking.html

Wolność dla marzeń, wolność dla kredytów!

"Nikt już nie pamięta, że w 2006 roku pod siedzibą NBP zorganizowano demonstrację w obronie kredytów walutowych, do których ograniczenia zmierzały regulacje wprowadzane przez Komisję Nadzoru Bankowego a jeden z największych portfali finansowych zorganizował akcję Chcemy ryzykować!, której celem było zniechęcenie nadzoru bankowego do regulowania rynku kredytów walutowych. (...)

Rekomendacja S nie zakazywała udzielania kredytów walutowych. Nakazywała bankom informowanie klientów o ryzyku walutowym i potwierdzanie tego przez podpisywany przez kredytobiorców dokument. Zwiększała także wymagania kredytowe dla kredytów walutowych w ten sposób, że zmieniała zasady obliczania zdolności kredytowej w taki sposób by uwzględnić negatywny scenariusz – zdolność kredytowa miała być obliczana jak dla złotówkowych stóp procentowych i dla kwoty kredytu powiększonej o 20%.

Rekomendacja S weszła w życie latem 2006, przy kursie CHF na poziomie około 2,5 PLN i z tego okresu pochodzi cytowany niżej raport. Już w czwartym akapicie znajduje się moim zdaniem świetna ilustracja nastrojów towarzyszących w tamtym okresie próbom ograniczenia kredytów walutowych:

Instytut Globalizacji uznał działania KNB za szczególnie dotkliwe wobec młodych ludzi, których jedną decyzją pozbawiono możliwości realizacji marzeń o posiadaniu własnego mieszkania"

http://www.trystero.pl/archives/12949