"The American financial establishment has an incredible ability to celebrate the inconsequential while ignoring the vital. Last week, while the Wall Street Journal pondered how the Fed may set interest rates three to four years in the future (an exercise that David Stockman rightly compared to debating how many angels could dance on the head of a pin), the media almost completely ignored one of the most chilling pieces of financial news that I have ever seen. According to a small story in the Financial Times, some Fed officials would like to require retail owners of bond mutual funds to pay an "exit fee" to liquidate their positions. Come again? That such a policy would even be considered tells us much about the current fragility of our bond market and the collective insanity of layers of unnecessary regulation."
"The Federal Reserve can keep their balance sheet at the current size (and keep the risk asset party going) or it can position itself to be able to hike rates — but it cannot do both."
"It’s often mentioned that the Fed buys bonds in asset swaps. This is true. Where many people get confused is that it is not an asset swap for the banks. When the Fed buys bonds, they typically buy them from non-banks. The bonds are removed from circulation and put on the Fed’s balance sheet, while the Fed pays for these bonds with newly created reserves. Now these reserves must be deposited at a bank, so they will show up at a bank as new deposits."
"Inwestorzy korzystający z narzędzi opartych na liczbach Fibonacciego i złotej proporcji posługują się w istocie magią. Narzędzia te dają graczom jedynie fałszywe poczucie zrozumienia procesów zachodzących na wykresie cenowym."
"Patrick Augustin, Menachem Brenner, Marti Subrahmanyam (ABS) stworzyli bazę 1859 transakcji (fuzji i przejęć) z lat 1996-2012, dla których posiadali dane o notowaniach akcji i opcji na akcje. Następnie sprawdzili w jak wielu przypadkach zachowanie rynku opcji na 30 dni przed ogłoszeniem transakcji odpowiada zachowaniu będącemu wynikiem działań inwestorów posiadających informacje o przyszłych transakcjach M&A."
"Badacze stwierdzili, że nawet 1/4 transakcji M&A z ich bazy poprzedzona jest pozytywnym nadzwyczajnym obrotem na opcjach na akcje przejmowanej spółki. Co więcej, wspomniany nadzwyczajny obrót jest najmocniej widoczny na opcjach kupna poza pieniędzmi (OTM call) – z więc na instrumentach najbardziej atrakcyjnych z punktu widzenia inwestora posiadającego poufne informacje o transakcji M&A (przeciętna 1-dniowa premia za przejęcie to 31% w bazie ABS)."
"By "loan demand", we usually mean the demand from households and corporations for the credit provided by banks. But actually this makes no sense. What households and corporations actually want is not loans. It is money.
Households that have money generally do not borrow. They buy their houses, cars, yachts, holidays to Bermuda with money they already have. It is households that DON'T have money that borrow. They do so in order to buy the houses, cars, holidays to Ibiza (perhaps not yachts so much) that they don't have the money to afford. They would really like to buy these things from money they already have, but there isn't enough of it right now, and in the case of houses there won't be for at least 25 years even if they save assiduously. They do not "want" loans. They want money."
"Loan assets are claims on the future income of households, corporations and governments. Lending is always a bit of a gamble: future income is by definition uncertain. Default happens when income in reality does not match the expectations against which the loan was advanced. The interest payments on a loan are both compensation for the opportunity cost to the lender of not using the money (although in the case of banks which create money when they lend, the existence of this opportunity cost is debateable) and, more importantly, a consideration or surety against possible future default. The higher the likelihood of future default, the higher the interest payments."
"It seems unlikely that the ECB is unaware of the effect of negative rates on Danish lending volumes. So despite extensive comments in the media about negative rates encouraging banks to lend, I doubt if that is the real purpose. Indeed, as lending figures for the Eurozone actually , it is hard to see why the ECB would act now when it did not earlier this year.
So I don’t think this is about bank lending at all. I think it is about German disinflation and the exchange value of the Euro."
"The recent public outcry over high frequency trading is pointless. Solutions exist. Virtually every comparable market in the world uses them already.
But, some electronic exchanges may not willingly adopt them. Doing so may disrupt their current business model. The incentives are misaligned, and competitors or regulators may need to force the issue to see change. Luckily, the issue to be forced is far simpler than most think.
It’s time to add quality to the matching process. Over thousands of years, every naturally evolved market has headed this direction – from the ancient Greeks to Alibaba.com. It’s time for Wall Street to realize what they lost along the way, and how it can fix far more than just HFT."
"“Inflation”, , “is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”. Upon this statement has been built three decades of faith in the omnipotence of central banks. It does not matter what government does: it does not matter what markets do: it does not matter what shocks there are to the economy. As long as central banks get the money supply right, there will be no inflation. Or deflation. Growth will simply proceed smoothly along a pre-determined path.
Leaving aside the question of whether central banks really control the money supply at all in an endogenous fiat money system, it is clear to me that the control of inflation – in all its forms – is by no means so simple. Despite Friedman’s statement, the forces that create inflation and deflation are in reality poorly understood."