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Is It Time for the Fed to Contract Its Balance Sheet?

"The Federal Reserve can keep their balance sheet at the current size (and keep the risk asset party going) or it can position itself to be able to hike rates — but it cannot do both."

"It’s often mentioned that the Fed buys bonds in asset swaps. This is true. Where many people get confused is that it is not an asset swap for the banks. When the Fed buys bonds, they typically buy them from non-banks. The bonds are removed from circulation and put on the Fed’s balance sheet, while the Fed pays for these bonds with newly created reserves. Now these reserves must be deposited at a bank, so they will show up at a bank as new deposits."


Banks Don't Lend Out Reserves

"Firstly, here’s a short explanation of bank lending. Under normal circumstances, deposits and loans are more-or-less equal across the banking system as a whole. This is because when a bank creates a new loan, it also creates a new balancing deposit. It creates this “from thin air”, not from existing money: banks do not “lend out” existing deposits, as is commonly thought."

"When the Fed buys private sector assets from investors, it not only creates new deposits, it creates new reserves. This is because a new deposit (liability) in a bank must be balanced by an equivalent asset. When banks create deposits by lending, the equivalent asset is a loan. When the Fed creates deposits by buying assets, the equivalent asset is an increase in reserves, also newly created. So it does not matter how much lending banks do, if the Fed is creating new deposit/reserve pairs by buying assets from private sector investors then deposits will ALWAYS exceed loans by the amount of those new reserves."


http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2014/01/21/banks-dont-lend-out-reserves/

Repeat After Me: Banks Cannot And Do Not "Lend Out" Reserves

Polecam przeczytać całość dokumentu. :)

"John Maynard Keynes famously wrote that: "Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist."  A modern example of that dictum, relevant to the economy, policy, and markets, is the widespread view that banks can "lend out" their reserves (deposits) at the central bank, as if bank reserves represented a pool of money that is just waiting to "flow into" bank lending. Because such a thing cannot occur and therefore has not occurred, the point is usually made in reverse: banks currently are not "lending out" their reserves--rather they are "parking" their reserves at the central bank or leaving them "idle." But that they might lend them out in the future is a lurking risk and a reason to be cautious about the central bank engaging in aggressive quantitative easing (QE)."

"• Many talk as if banks can "lend out" their reserves, raising concerns that massive excess reserves created by QE could fuel runaway credit creation and inflation in the future. But banks cannot lend their reserves directly to commercial borrowers, so this concern is misplaced.
• Banks do need to hold reserves (as a liquidity buffer) against their deposits, and banks create deposits when they lend. But normally banks are not reserve constrained, so excess reserves do not loosen a reserve constraint.
• Banks in aggregate can reduce their reserves only to the extent that they initiate new lending and the bank deposits created as a result flow into the economy as new banknotes as the public demands more of them.
• QE does aim to ease financial conditions and spur more bank lending than otherwise would have occurred, bu tthe mechanisms by which this happens are much more subtle and indirect than commonly implied.
• If the excess reserves created by QE were to be associated with too much credit creation, central banks could readily extinguish them."


The Days Of The Super-Powered Chinese Economy Are Over

"The recent liquidity crunch, and its cause, illustrates some of the difficulties China's economy will face in the future. Over the last two years, and especially in 2013, mainland corporations with offshore affiliates had been borrowing money abroad, faking trade invoices to import the money disguised as export revenues, and profitably relending it as Chinese yuan. As China receives more dollars from exports and foreign investment than it spends on imports and Chinese investment abroad, the People's Bank of China, the central bank, is forced to buy those excess dollars to maintain the value of the yuan. It does this by borrowing yuan in the domestic markets. But because its borrowing cost is greater than the return it receives when it invests those dollars in low-earning U.S. Treasury bonds, the central bank loses money as its reserves expand."

Authored by Michael Pettis, originally posted at Foreign Policy.


What the Danish negative rate experience tells us

"In fact a deposit rate cut will likely drain liquidity from the Euro area banking system and accelerate the early repayment of LTRO funds. Negative interest rates on deposits incentivize banks to “get rid” of their excess deposits rather than suffer an erosion of capital. But the amount of reserves in the system can only be changed if Euro area banks decide to collectively reduce their reliance on the ECB. If a commercial bank makes a loan or buys a bond to avoid negative rates, they simply pass reserves on to another bank, which ultimately end up back at the ECB. As such, excess reserves would become something of a ‘hot potato’, with no bank wanting them at the end of the day. Core banks are more susceptible to negative deposit rates. Core banks have €620bn of deposits and have borrowed €190bn (gross) from the ECB. In other words they are collectively “long cash” by around €430bn (€620bn – €190bn). In contrast peripheral banks are “short cash” by €650bn."