Pokazywanie postów oznaczonych etykietą JP Morgan. Pokaż wszystkie posty
Pokazywanie postów oznaczonych etykietą JP Morgan. Pokaż wszystkie posty

JPMorgan Chase and the London Whale: Understanding the Hedge That Wasn’t

Gdyby ktoś chciał sobie przypomnieć za co JP Morgan dostał teraz prawie miliard dolarów kary.

"The London Whale is a trader by the name of Bruno Iksil, who earned his nickname by betting huge sums of money in the derivatives markets from his home base in London. As one hedge fund manager recently quipped, “Bernanke is to Treasuries what the London Whale is to derivatives.” But to point out that the London Whale jumped the shark with these trades would be an understatement (he is now expected to leave the bank).

Let’s digest what we know thus far about the trade. Iksil had three discrete components to his trading strategy, which I will call packages A, B, and C as follows:

(A) JPM purchased credit default swaps (CDS) on high-yield bonds in which JPM would make money if high-yield bonds went down.
(B) JPM wrote substantial amounts of CDX.NA.IG.9, which is a basket of CDS on investment-grade bonds from 121 different issuers.
(C) JPM bought CDS on investment-grade bonds."


The Incredible Shrinking COMEX Gold Warehouse Inventories

"Just 3-1/2 years ago in early 2011, COMEX warehouses held more than 11 million ounces of eligible gold, with JPM holding more than 3 million of these 11 million ounces. As of August 9, 2013, JPM’s eligible gold has fallen from 3+ million ounces to 361,606 ounces. Thus, it is safe to conclude that physical gold is being withdrawn from COMEX warehouse due to a lack of trust in the global banking sector’s honesty and credibility. Though most statistics today discuss the collapse in eligible gold, I actually believe that the collapse in registered gold is more compelling. Recall that registered gold is the gold held at the COMEX that is available for delivery while eligible gold is not “eligible” for delivery."


JPMorgan Chase’s Crazy Fine Tally

"JPMorgan Chase is one of America’s largest and most highly regarded banks. But in the past few years, it has paid out several billion dollars to settle lawsuits from consumers and regulators."
"The nice thing about being in the financial services world is that you never really have to say you’re sorry. Screw over customers, botch foreclosures, run afoul of important regulations, and violate some important rules—and the worst you’ll have to do is pay some fines or settlements. It’s a cost of doing business, even for America’s most highly regarded banks."


JPMorgan Chase whale trades: A case history of derivatives risks and abuses

Jeśli kogoś zainteresowała publikowana wcześniej na Grupie historia London Whale (http://dealbreaker.com/2012/05/the-tale-of-a-whale-of-a-fail/), gdzie zostało opisane, jak londyńskie biuro JP Morgan poniosło stratę rzędu ponad 6 mld USD, polecam przeglądnąć raport przygotowany przez komisję amerykańskiego Senatu. Po kolei jest w nim opisane, jak złamane zostały regulacje dotyczące kontroli ryzyka w jednym z największych amerykańskich banków.

"The JPMorgan Chase whale trades first drew public attention in April 2012. Beginning that same month, Senator Carl Levin’s office made preliminary inquiries into what happened and subsequently received a series of briefings from JPMorgan Chase. On June 13, 2012, the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs held a hearing in which JPMorgan Chase’sChief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon testified and answered questions about the whale trades. On June 19, 2012, Mr. Dimon appeared at a second hearing before the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services.
In July 2012, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations initiated a bipartisan investigation into the trades. Over the course of the next nine months, the Subcommittee collected nearly 90,000 documents, reviewed and, in somecases transcribed, over 200 recorded telephone conversations and instant messaging exchanges, and conducted over 25 interviews of bank and regulatory agency personnel. The Subcommittee also received over 25 briefings from the bank and its regulators, including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and consulted with government and private sector experts in financial regulation, accounting practices, derivatives trading, and derivatives valuation."


The Tale Of A Whale Of A Fail

Część z Was pamięta pewnie głośną historię prawie z przed roku - gigantyczną stratę londyńskiego pracownika JP Morgan w wysokości ostatecznie około 6,2 miliarda USD. Ten tekst wprawdzie jest z początku wyjaśniania całej historii, ale całkiem ciekawym językiem opisuje prawdopodobny mechanizm tamtej transakcji. Jeśli cała historia Was zaciekawi, polecam przeczytać inne tekst oznaczone nazwiskiem Iksil - można tam znaleźć całą masę linków do innych opisów tego przypadku.
"What seems, loosely, to have happened to the Whale is a combination of things. One is, he got more optimistic and so sold more protection – making the bet relatively more bullish, though not absolutely bullish. It is almost certainly – though who knows? – not correct to say, as everyone does, that Iksil was long $100 billion of corporate credit in his CDX book. It is certainly correct to say that the CIO was overall long credit – that’s what it does! invest JPMorgan’s money in credit instruments! – or that JPMorgan as a whole was long credit – it’s a bank! – but the credit derivatives book probably was a hedge designed to hedge tail risk."