When Is the Best Time of Day for a Company to Dump Bad News?

"Market watchers have long griped about companies that try to bury their bad news by releasing it late on a Friday afternoon. Earnings shortfalls, product recalls, outlandish severance deals—these things always seem to hit the wires just as we’re kicking off our pumps and wingtips for the weekend. The website Footnoted even runs a regular feature called the Friday Night Dump, in which it combs through end-of-the-week SEC FILINGS for dirty laundry.

But does this old PR trick even work in a world of 24/7 news services and social media? Not when it comes to earnings announcements, according to a working paper by Stanford Graduate School of Business accounting professor Ed deHaan and colleagues. In fact, by one measure, Friday filings might even get a little extra scrutiny—presumably the opposite of what those companies were hoping for."

http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/11/when-is-the-best-time-of-day-for-a-company-to-dump-bad-news/383049/

Potential Output and Recessions: Are We Fooling Ourselves?

"The economic collapse in the wake of the global financial crises (GFC) and the weaker-than-expected recovery in many countries have led to questions about the impact of severe downturns on economic potential. Indeed, for several major economies, the level of output is nowhere near returning to pre-crisis trend (figure 1). Such developments have resulted in repeated downward revisions to estimates of potential output by private- and public-sector forecasters. In addition, this disappointment in post-recession growth has contributed to concerns that the U.S. economy, among others, is entering an era of secular stagnation. However, the historical experience of advanced economies around recessions indicates that the current experience is less unusual than one might think. First, output typically does not return to pre-crisis trend following recessions, especially deep ones. Second, in response, forecasters repeatedly revise down measures of trend."

http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/ifdp-notes/2014/potential-output-and-recessions-are-we-fooling-ourselves-20141112.html

Różne wnioski z tych samych danych

"Wśród ekonomistów i komentatorów rynkowych panuje zgodna opinia, że po kryzysie finansowym na początku lat 90. ubiegłego wieku Japonia, w ekonomicznym sensie doświadczyła dwóch straconych dekad.

Rzeczywiście jeśli porówna się zmianę PKB w Japonii, USA i państwach europejskich to można zauważyć, że japońska gospodarka rozwijała się dużo wolniej. Skupianie się jednak tylko na poziomie wzrostu gospodarczego może prowadzić do błędnych wniosków.

Populacja Japończyków w wieku produkcyjnym (15-64) osiągnęła szczyt w 1995 i od tego czasu spadła o około 10%. Nieuwzględnienie tego gigantycznego czynnika demograficznego, który przecież nie wynika z obecnej sytuacji gospodarczej Japonii, w analizie japońskich sukcesów i porażek gospodarczych wydaję się nierozsądne."

http://blogi.bossa.pl/2014/12/15/rozne-wnioski-z-tych-samych-danych/

W pętli ZIRP

"Wczorajszy komunikat po posiedzeniu FOMC jest majstersztykiem polityki monetarnej w świecie zerowych stóp procentowych (ZIRP), ale naprawdę w tle widać grę z polityką innych banków centralnych i strach przed konsekwencjami, jakie mogą przynieść… rynkowe oczekiwania."

http://blogi.bossa.pl/2014/12/18/w-petli-zirp/

Dash for Cash: Month-End Liquidity Needs and the Predictability of Stock Returns

"This paper uncovers strong return reversals in stock market returns around the last monthly settlement day, T-3, which guarantees liquidity for month-end cash distributions. We show that these return reversals are stronger in countries where the mutual fund ownership is large, and that in the US the return reversals have become stronger over time as the mutual fund ownership of stocks has increased. Finally, in the cross-section of stocks, the reversals around turn of the month are stronger for stocks more commonly held by mutual funds, for liquid stocks, and for more volatile stocks (controlling for liquidity)."

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2528692

Has The Bank Of Japan Started Another Round Of Central Bank Wargames?

"Never pick a fight with a central bank. The only one who gets hurt is you. Unless, of course, you are another central bank."

"So it is not quite true that a currency-issuing central bank has no opponents. No-one in the private sector will oppose it, unless they have a deathwish. But other currency-issuing central banks might, if they perceive its actions as threatening to their own economies. "

http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2014/11/01/has-the-bank-of-japan-started-another-round-of-central-bank-wargames/

Paradoks płacenia za nieistniejące umiejętności

"W połowie września świat finansów obiegła wiadomość, że największy fundusz emerytalny w USA – kalifornijski CalPERS – całkowicie rezygnuje z inwestowania w fundusze hedge. CalPERS jako powód swojej decyzji podał chęć uproszczenia procesu inwestycyjnego i obniżenia kosztów. Barry Ritholtz nazwał to wydarzenie kalifornijskim trzęsieniem ziemi w funduszach hedge."

"Z decyzji CalPERS oraz z komentarzy odnoszących się do tej decyzji można wyciągnąć dwa interesujące wnioski. Pierwsze spostrzeżenie dotyczy relacji pomiędzy umiejętnościami zarządzających, opłatami za zarządzanie i wynikami netto sektora. Matt Levine przedstawił bardzo prosty model ilustrujący pewien paradoks sektora funduszy hedge."

http://blogi.bossa.pl/2014/10/06/paradoks-placenia-na-nieistniejace-umiejetnosci/

Asset Quality Review czyli czego boi się Europa?

"Otóż EBC sprawdza, co kryje się w aktywach największych banków strefy euro i czy przypadkiem nie dochodzi w nich do zaniżania wag ryzyka a przez to zawyżania współczynników wypłacalności i fałszowania obrazu kondycji całego sektora bankowego w Europie. Bankom zależy na tym, aby na papierze ryzyko przez nie podejmowane było jak najmniejsze, z uwagi na wymogi kapitałowe stawiane im przez regulacje Basel III/CRR/CRD IV. Zasada generalna jest następująca: im bardziej ryzykowne aktywa są w bilansie banku, tym więcej kapitału własnego dany bank powinien posiadać, aby zamortyzować ewentualny default ferelnego aktywa."

http://wykresologia.blogspot.com/2014/10/asset-quality-review-czyli-czego-boi.html

Why is the Shiller CAPE So High?

"Why is the Shiller CAPE so high?  In the last several weeks, a number of prominent academics and financial market commentators have attempted to answer this question, to include the inventor of the valuation measure himself, Nobel Laureate Robert Shiller.  In this piece, I’m going to attempt to give a clear answer.

The piece has five parts:

·         In the first part, I’m going to explain why valuations in general are higher than they have been historically.  It’s not just the CAPE that’s historically elevated; the simple TTM P/E ratio is also historically elevated, by a reasonably large amount.

·         In the second part, I’m going to highlight the main reason that the Shiller CAPE has risen relative to the simple TTM P/E over the last two decades: high real EPS growth. I’m going to introduce a schematic that intuitively illustrates why high real EPS growth produces a high Shiller CAPE.

·         In the third part, I’m going to explain how reductions in the dividend payout ratio have contributed to high real EPS growth.  In discussing the dividend payout ratio, I’m going to present a different, potentially more accurate formulation of the Shiller CAPE, a formulation that conducts the calculation based on total return instead of price.  On this formulation, the Shiller CAPE falls by around 10%, from 26.0 to 23.5.

·         In the fourth part, I’m going to explain how a secular uptrend in profit margins has contributed to high real EPS growth over the last two decades.  This effect is the most powerful of all, and is the main reason why the Shiller CAPE and the TTM P/E have diverged in their valuation signals.

·         In the fifth part, I’m going to outline a set of possible future return scenarios that investors at current valuations can reasonably expect.  I’m then going to identify the future return scenario that I find most credible."

http://www.philosophicaleconomics.com/2014/08/capehigh/

Ograniczenia wyceny rynkowej

"Media biznesowe regularnie donoszą o astronomicznych wycenach rynkowych zwłaszcza w segmencie technologicznych startupów. Informacje o wielomiliardowej wycenie kilkuletniej spółki, która nie osiąga jeszcze przychodów, nie wspominając o zyskach, są z reguły pretekstem do rozpoczęcia dyskusji o bańce spekulacyjnej.

Miałem okazję zapoznać się niedawno z dwoma interesującymi spojrzeniami na ten problem. Pierwsze z nich przedstawia wyceny technologicznych startupów z pespektywy niedostępnej dla inwestorów – branżowej, biznesowej. Drugie podejście sugeruje, że dziennikarze, analitycy i blogerzy nadużywają określenia „rynek wycenia” (i jego pochodnych) i używają go w kontekście, w którym o żadnej wycenie rynkowej nie ma mowy."

http://blogi.bossa.pl/2014/09/24/ograniczenia-wyceny-rynkowej/

Don't pin all your hopes on SME asset-backed securities

"So the idea must be that the presence of the ECB in the SME ABS market would spur loan issuance. To make a significant difference to credit conditions in the periphery and repair the broken monetary policy transmission mechanism, that loan issuance would have to be simply huge and concentrated in periphery countries. There are several problems with this, to my mind.

Firstly,it makes a huge assumption about the scale of potential demand for credit in the periphery from creditworthy SMEs. Is discouraged demand really that huge - or is there actually a problem with the creditworthiness of potential borrowers, because of the widespread destruction of physical and human capital in the periphery? Distressed corporate loans in the periphery are far higher than in the core. That's why spreads are so high. Why would an SME ABS programme improve the creditworthiness of borrowers?"

http://coppolacomment.blogspot.com/2014/09/dont-pin-all-your-hopes-on-sme-asset.html

Draghi's Jackson Hole speech has been misunderstood

 "Mario Draghi's speech at Jackson Hole on August 22nd caused a considerable stir. For the first time, he admitted that the absence of a central bank backstop for government borrowing means both higher borrowing costs for governments and a greater likelihood of market punishment for profligate governments (...)."

"And the consequences of this shocking waste of human capital could be serious. Highly-indebted governments in the Eurozone depend on high tax revenues in the future to reduce their debt burdens: while even less heavily indebted governments such as Germany will also need high tax revenues in the future to support their increasing proportion of elderly. The future fiscal sustainability of the Eurozone depends on the young people whose futures are currently being systematically destroyed by unemployment. THIS is what Draghi's speech is about."

http://www.pieria.co.uk/articles/draghis_jackson_hole_speech_has_been_misunderstood

7 Reasons the economic crisis is a crisis for economics

"For critics of mainstream economics, the 2008 financial crisis represents the final nail in the coffin for a paradigm that should have died decades ago. Not only did economists fail to see it coming, they can’t agree on how to get past it and they have yet to produce a model that can understand it fully. A number of books critical of economics have been written or re-written with the crisis in mind; articles by journalists and critical economists are keen to use the crisis as evidence of the fields failings; and that student-led anti-economics initiatives call themselves things like the  'Post-Crash Economics Society' speaks for itself.

However, economists tend to see things differently – in my experience, your average economist will concede that although the crisis is a challenge, it’s a challenge that has limited implications for the field as a whole. Some go even further and argue that it is all but irrelevant, whether due to progress being made in the field or because the crisis represents a fundamentally unforeseeable event in a complex world. Below I have compiled the 7 most common arguments used to defend economic theory after the crisis, and will consider each of them in turn, with the quality of the arguments increasing as we go further down the list."

http://www.pieria.co.uk/articles/why_the_economic_crisis_is_a_crisis_for_economics

How Significant is the BRICS New Development Bank?

"The argument that the creation of the BRICS Bank could make a significant difference to the global financial architecture should not be pushed too far. In the final analysis development banks are instruments of state capitalist development. Such specialised institutions are needed because of the shortfalls in the availability of long-term finance for capital-intensive projects in market economies, resulting from the maturity and liquidity mismatches involved. Resources mobilised are from those wanting shorter maturities and greater liquidity, and sums lent are to projects that are large and illiquid with long gestations lags and long-term profit profiles."

"Whether even this difference would be material depends on three factors. The first is the degree to which the emergence of the NDB alters the global financial architecture and perhaps, therefore, the behaviour of the institutions currently populating it. The second is the degree to which the BRICS bank can differ in its lending practices from the institutions that currently dominate the global development-banking infrastructure. And, the third is the degree to which a development bank set up as a tool of state-guided development by governments in countries pursuing capitalist and even neoliberal development trajectories can indeed contribute to furthering goals of more equitable and sustainable development."

http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/08/significant-brics-new-development-bank.html

Europejski Enron 2.0

"Na początku lipca specjalizująca się w krótkiej sprzedaży i audycie śledczym firma inwestycyjna Gotham City Research opublikowała raport analityczny, w którym stwierdziła, że spółka Let’s Gowex (GWO) jest finansowym oszustwem fabrykującym nawet 90% swoich przychodów i ustaliła cenę docelową spółki na poziomie 0."

"Historia Let’s Gowex i jej charyzmatycznego założyciela i prezesa dostarcza wielu cennych lekcji o rynku akcyjnym. W niniejszym tekście skupię się na tym co zrobił GCR i co robią podobne firmy inwestycyjne. Od czasu do czasu na Blogi Bossa wraca dyskusja o przewadze rynkowej – czym jest i skąd inwestor ma wiedzieć, że ją posiada. Wydaje się mi, że inwestorzy potrafiący stwierdzić, że spółka, o której rynek nie ma zielonego pojęcia, że jest oszustwem, jest jednym wielkim szwindlem, mogą się pochwalić autentyczną przewagę. Inwestorzy z detektywistycznym zacięciem i znajomością rachunkowości mogą spróbować swoich sił w audycie śledczym. "

http://blogi.bossa.pl/2014/08/20/europejski-enron-2-0/

How Much Do Hurricanes Hurt the Economy?

"For years economists have debated whether destructive storms are even bad for a country's economy. To a non-economist, the ill effects of a storm might seem intuitive, but economists have a knack for finding plausible counterintuitive explanations."

"Hsiang and Jina looked at 6,712 cyclones, typhoons, and hurricanes observed from 1950 to 2008 and the economic fortunes of the countries they struck in the years that followed. With their data, Jina and Hsiang can decisively say: These storms are bad—very bad—for economic growth."

"The effects are lasting: Overall, they find that "each additional meter per second of annual nationally-averaged wind exposure lowers per capita economic output 0.37 percent 20 years later" (emphasis added). Put simply, economies "do not recover in the long run." 

So what does this mean for a planet with a changing climate?"

http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/08/how-much-do-hurricanes-hurt-the-economy/375594/

Buffett Waits on Fat Pitch as Cash Hoard Tops $50 Billion

"Warren Buffett has never had so much money to spend.

Cash at his Omaha, Nebraska-based Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (BRK/A) rose past $50 billion at the end of June, the first time it finished a quarter above that level since he became chairman and chief executive officer more than four decades ago."

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-04/buffett-waits-on-fat-pitch-as-cash-hoard-tops-50-billion.html

How to rip off a bank, Espirito Santo style

"I have been going through Banco Espírito Santo's half-year 2014 results. They make pretty grim reading. No, actually it's worse than that. They read like an instruction manual on how to rip off a bank.

I can't work out if the BES management at the time was stupid, naïve, complacent or criminal. Probably all four. No matter – it has now been entirely replaced. Well, I say “no matter” - but actually such abysmal management DOES matter. Those responsible for audit, risk and compliance have been guilty of incompetence so gross it borders on the criminal. And the former CEO and vice-chairman, Ricardo Espírito Santo Salgardo – a member of the Espírito Santo family – has been arrested on suspicion of money laundering and tax evasion. But I suspect he has done more than that: he was also chairman of ESFG, which – as will become apparent shortly – systematically drained the bank and its other subsidiaries. If he didn't know what was going on, he was incompetent: if he did, then he was a party to corruption and fraud on a simply massive scale. Exactly how massive is not yet clear. But I think we are talking billions of Euros."

http://www.pieria.co.uk/articles/how_to_rip_off_a_bank_esprito_santo_style

Creeping nationalisation

"Commercial banks are slowly dying. The activities that were formerly profitable are either illegal, immoral or simply not profitable any more. And the core activities that society wants and needs are also unprofitable, at least if they are done in the way that society has come to expect – free-while-in-credit transaction accounts, inflation-level interest on deposits, fixed low margins on lending. Meanwhile, commercial banks face stiff competition from new competitors – not new banks, though there are some of these, mostly backed by large retail organisations – but an astonishing and ever-increasing range of mostly internet or phone-based providers of deposit-taking, lending and payments services. Unlike the new providers, banks are having to meet higher capital and liquidity requirements and comply with tighter regulations, while suffering margin squeeze because of low interest rates and a continual drain of dissatisfied customers. And they are still facing legal costs and fines for their past misbehaviour. It's a very tough world for banks at the moment.

And they are paying the price. The big investment banks are already breaking themselves up, and they will be followed in due course by the big universal and retail banks. What has not been achieved through regulation may yet be achieved through market forces."

http://coppolacomment.blogspot.com/2014/07/creeping-nationalisation.html

BRICS’ new financial institutions could undermine US-EU global dominance

"During the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, when middle-income countries were hard hit by big capital outflows, there was an effort by China, Japan, Taiwan and other countries to put together an Asian Monetary Fund to offer balance of payments support. Washington vetoed the idea, insisting that all assistance had to go through the International Monetary Fund. The result was a mess, including an unnecessarily deep regional recession, as the IMF failed to act as a lender of last resort and then attached all kinds of harmful and unnecessary conditions to its lending.

But the world has changed a lot in the past 15 years. Last week the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) decided to form the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and the New Development Bank (NDB), and the United States will not have a veto this time. These new institutions could mark a turning point for the international financial system."

http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/brics-developmentbankimffinance.html

Cztery analizy

"Literatura i praktyka proponują nam 4 rodzaje analiz decyzyjnych, których granice zacierają się na tyle, że mogą powodować pewien rodzaj niedopowiedzeń i nieświadomych działań oraz ocen.

Ich zakres rozpościera się od matematycznych czy statystycznych modeli z jednej strony po dyskrecjonalne (intuicyjne) oceny na przeciwległym biegunie. Krótki przegląd powinien pomóc rozpoznać ich wady i zalety, a przez to pozwolić odnaleźć nasze własne miejsce na tej mapie. A może przede wszystkim określić źródła części porażek.

Uprzedzę jedynie, że używane przez mnie niektóre nazwy mają charakter jedynie umowny."

"1. Analizy ilościowe"

"2. Analiza quasi-ilościowa"

"3. Analiza ilościowo – intuicyjna (lub inaczej: dyskrecjonalna, od ang. discretionary)."

"4. Analiza dyskrecjonalna (intuicyjna)."

http://blogi.bossa.pl/2014/07/15/cztery-analizy/

http://blogi.bossa.pl/2014/07/19/cztery-analizy-czesc-2/

BIS Slams the Fed; Ridiculous Question of the Day: "Is The Fed Going To Attempt A Controlled Collapse?"

Obszernym fragmentem wpisu jest podsumowanie w 31 punktach ostatniego raportu Bank for International Settlements (BIS), które warto przeczytać.

"The question stems from lengthy (256 page PDF) from the BIS Annual Report (Bank for International Settlements) that stated among other things "The only source of lasting prosperity is a stronger supply side. It is essential to move away from debt as the main engine of growth."

The BIS slammed the Fed in numerous places and in numerous ways, especially regarding the Fed's reliance on QE."

"30. Policy responses matter too. Central banks find it difficult to operate with policy rates that are considerably different from those prevailing in the key currencies, especially the US dollar. Concerns with exchange rate overshooting and capital inflows make them reluctant to accept large and possibly volatile interest rate differentials, which contributes to highly correlated short-term interest rate movements. Indeed, the evidence is growing that US policy rates significantly influence policy rates elsewhere. Very low interest rates in the major advanced economies thus pose a dilemma for other central banks. On the one hand, tying domestic policy rates to the very low rates abroad helps mitigate currency appreciation and capital inflows. On the other hand, it may also fuel domestic financial booms and hence encourage the build-up of vulnerabilities. Indeed, there is evidence that those countries in which policy rates have been lower relative to traditional benchmarks, which take account of output and inflation developments, have also seen the strongest credit booms."

http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2014/07/bis-slams-fed-ridiculous-question-of.html

Why Europe Needs Two Euros, Not One

"As the Eurozone cautiously implements stabilising reforms, Germany is forced to go further with concessions than it would prefer. This column suggests that it would be beneficial for discontented members to consider the formation of a second monetary union. The second euro can be constructed better than the first, bringing the discontented members exchange-rate adjustments relative to Germany, and avoiding competitive devaluations."

"A repeated question about the Eurozone is whether the members form an optimal currency area. But another question – which is actually closer to Mundell’s original contribution (Mundell 1961) – is whether the right number of currencies in the Eurozone is as high as 18, the number of member countries in the system. If the right number is neither 1 nor 18, then 2 may be far, far better than either extreme.

Let me begin by recalling the reasons why 18 would be too many. First, some of the members are probably small enough to have no scope for using monetary or exchange rate policy as a tool of economic stabilisation over the business cycle (McKinnon 1963). Next, the 18 members do form an economically integrated group of geographical neighbours, and therefore their mutual efforts to use monetary and exchange rate policy to their advantage could easily lead them to enter into non-cooperative games with costly Nash consequences. Finally, national monetary policy can mean Treasury-dominated monetary policy, which can lead to very poor outcomes apart from strategic games with any foreigners, near and far."

http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/07/europe-needs-two-euros-one.html

The Bond Trap

"The American financial establishment has an incredible ability to celebrate the inconsequential while ignoring the vital. Last week, while the Wall Street Journal pondered how the Fed may set interest rates three to four years in the future (an exercise that David Stockman rightly compared to debating how many angels could dance on the head of a pin), the media almost completely ignored one of the most chilling pieces of financial news that I have ever seen. According to a small story in the Financial Times, some Fed officials would like to require retail owners of bond mutual funds to pay an "exit fee" to liquidate their positions. Come again? That such a policy would even be considered tells us much about the current fragility of our bond market and the collective insanity of layers of unnecessary regulation."

http://www.europac.net/commentaries/bond_trap

Is It Time for the Fed to Contract Its Balance Sheet?

"The Federal Reserve can keep their balance sheet at the current size (and keep the risk asset party going) or it can position itself to be able to hike rates — but it cannot do both."

"It’s often mentioned that the Fed buys bonds in asset swaps. This is true. Where many people get confused is that it is not an asset swap for the banks. When the Fed buys bonds, they typically buy them from non-banks. The bonds are removed from circulation and put on the Fed’s balance sheet, while the Fed pays for these bonds with newly created reserves. Now these reserves must be deposited at a bank, so they will show up at a bank as new deposits."

http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2014/06/26/can-the-fed-raise-rates-without-throwing-cold-water-on-risk-assets/

Zabobony na parkiecie - liczby Fibonacciego

"Inwestorzy korzystający z narzędzi opartych na liczbach Fibonacciego i złotej proporcji posługują się w istocie magią. Narzędzia te dają graczom jedynie fałszywe poczucie zrozumienia procesów zachodzących na wykresie cenowym."

"Zwolenników krytykowanych powyżej metod podzieliłbym na Wierzących i Pragmatyków. Wierzący przekonani są, że posługują się narzędziem objawionym przez samą naturę i wszechświat. Pragmatycy zaś utrzymują, że nie wiedzą, czemu to działa, ale jednak działa i umożliwia zarabianie pieniędzy. Wierzących zapewne przekonać się nie uda, jednak odważnym Pragmatykom polecam eksperyment. Polega on na zmianie wartości w aplikacji służącej do rysowania zniesień na wybrane losowo liczby. Zapewniam, że nowe poziomy będą równie skuteczne jak poprzednie."

http://pulsinwestora.pb.pl/3741556,99627,zabobony-na-parkiecie

Jak bardzo powszechny jest insider trading?

"Patrick Augustin, Menachem Brenner, Marti Subrahmanyam (ABS) stworzyli bazę 1859 transakcji (fuzji i przejęć) z lat 1996-2012, dla których posiadali dane o notowaniach akcji i opcji na akcje. Następnie sprawdzili w jak wielu przypadkach zachowanie rynku opcji na 30 dni przed ogłoszeniem transakcji odpowiada zachowaniu będącemu wynikiem działań inwestorów posiadających informacje o przyszłych transakcjach M&A."

"Badacze stwierdzili, że nawet 1/4 transakcji M&A z ich bazy poprzedzona jest pozytywnym nadzwyczajnym obrotem na opcjach na akcje przejmowanej spółki. Co więcej, wspomniany nadzwyczajny obrót jest najmocniej widoczny na opcjach kupna poza pieniędzmi (OTM call) – z więc na instrumentach najbardziej atrakcyjnych z punktu widzenia inwestora posiadającego poufne informacje o transakcji M&A (przeciętna 1-dniowa premia za przejęcie to 31% w bazie ABS)."

http://blogi.bossa.pl/2014/06/18/jak-bardzo-powszechny-jest-insider-trading/

Sacred cows and the demand for loans

"By "loan demand", we usually mean the demand from households and corporations for the credit provided by banks. But actually this makes no sense. What households and corporations actually want is not loans. It is money.

Households that have money generally do not borrow. They buy their houses, cars, yachts, holidays to Bermuda with money they already have. It is households that DON'T have money that borrow. They do so in order to buy the houses, cars, holidays to Ibiza (perhaps not yachts so much) that they don't have the money to afford. They would really like to buy these things from money they already have, but there isn't enough of it right now, and in the case of houses there won't be for at least 25 years even if they save assiduously. They do not "want" loans. They want money."

"Loan assets are claims on the future income of households, corporations and governments. Lending is always a bit of a gamble: future income is by definition uncertain. Default happens when income in reality does not match the expectations against which the loan was advanced. The interest payments on a loan are both compensation for the opportunity cost to the lender of not using the money (although in the case of banks which create money when they lend, the existence of this opportunity cost is debateable) and, more importantly, a consideration or surety against possible future default. The higher the likelihood of future default, the higher the interest payments."

http://coppolacomment.blogspot.com/2014/06/sacred-cows-and-demand-for-money.htm

Why Negative Rates Won't Work In The Eurozone

"It seems unlikely that the ECB is unaware of the effect of negative rates on Danish lending volumes. So despite extensive comments in the media about negative rates encouraging banks to lend, I doubt if that is the real purpose. Indeed, as M3 lending figures for the Eurozone actually improved slightly in April, it is hard to see why the ECB would act now when it did not earlier this year.

So I don’t think this is about bank lending at all. I think it is about German disinflation and the exchange value of the Euro."

http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2014/06/04/why-negative-rates-wont-work-in-the-eurozone/

How To Fix High-Frequency Trading

"The recent public outcry over high frequency trading is pointless. Solutions exist. Virtually every comparable market in the world uses them already.

But, some electronic exchanges may not willingly adopt them. Doing so may disrupt their current business model. The incentives are misaligned, and competitors or regulators may need to force the issue to see change. Luckily, the issue to be forced is far simpler than most think.

It’s time to add quality to the matching process. Over thousands of years, every naturally evolved market has headed this direction – from the ancient Greeks to Alibaba.com. It’s time for Wall Street to realize what they lost along the way, and how it can fix far more than just HFT."

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-05-26/how-fix-high-frequency-trading

The Myth of the Omnipotent Central Bank

"“Inflation”, said Milton Friedman, “is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”. Upon this statement has been built three decades of faith in the omnipotence of central banks. It does not matter what government does: it does not matter what markets do: it does not matter what shocks there are to the economy. As long as central banks get the money supply right, there will be no inflation. Or deflation. Growth will simply proceed smoothly along a pre-determined path.

Leaving aside the question of whether central banks really control the money supply at all in an endogenous fiat money system, it is clear to me that the control of inflation – in all its forms – is by no means so simple. Despite Friedman’s statement, the forces that create inflation and deflation are in reality poorly understood."

http://pragcap.com/the-myth-of-the-omnipotent-central-bank

We Have No Idea What Our Capital is Worth

"That headline makes quite a statement. But it’s true. The stock of so-called “financial capital,” or wealth — all the financial assets out there, which are ultimately claims on real capital — represents only the most tenuous long-term approximation of what our real capital is worth.

Certainly true: the stock (total dollar value) of “financial capital” goes up (in fits, starts, and reverses) over the decades as real capital is accumulated. But beyond that rough, big-picture relationship, the total value of financial assets tells us very little about the total value of real assets.

Why?"

http://angrybearblog.com/2014/05/we-have-no-idea-what-our-capital-is-worth.html

Everything You Wanted To Know About Global Oil Fundamentals (But Were Afraid To Ask)

"There's more than one oil price around the world and as the following comprehensive (but brief) overview from Morgan Stanley's Global Energy Teach In shows, crude oil pricing across the world is dynamic and multi-factorial - from fundamental factors (such as simple supply and demand and seasonality) to macro factors (such as USD strength, macro sentiment, and "burden") and risk premia (e.g. geopolitics), the following provides everything you wanted to know about global crude oil fundamentals, but were afraid to ask..."

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-05-10/everything-you-wanted-know-about-global-oil-fundamentals-were-afraid-ask

Deutsche Bank's Latest Capital Raising Won't End Its Problems

"Deutsche Bank has finally admitted – to no-one’s surprise – that it needs more capital. It has announced plans to raise 8bn EUR of new Core Tier 1 equity capital (CET1).

Although everyone knew Deutsche Bank was short of capital, this admission is nevertheless somewhat embarrassing. Only last year, Deutsche Bank raised 3bn EUR with a rights issue and claimed that no further capital would be needed."

"To me, Deutsche Bank looks very much like the archetypal “too big to fail” zombie bank – draining money from central banks, sovereigns and investors while giving little in the way of returns. The question is for how long investors will be willing to put up with poor returns and repeated demands for more money – for if anyone thinks this is the last of Deutsche Bank’s capital raising, I fear they are very much mistaken. Though admittedly it is far from being the only European bank in this condition. European banks generally are in poor shape. It is to be hoped that the ECB’s stress tests will encourage them to put their houses in order."

http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2014/05/19/deutsche-banks-latest-capital-raising-wont-end-its-problems/

How Private Equity Firms Defraud Investors By Extracting 'Fees' From Their Portfolio Companies

"The modern private equity industry got its start in 1979 when, for the first time, a large, publicly traded company was taken private in a leveraged buyout. For the next 30 plus years, the industry escaped regulatory oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by adopting complex and opaque organizational structures designed for that purpose. That changed with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in the wake of the recent financial crisis. Since 2012 most mid-size and large private equity funds have been required to disclose their activities to the SEC. Last week reports of what the SEC found began to leak out.

Staff at the SEC has reviewed about 400 private equity funds. What did they learn?"

http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/04/29/how-private-equity-firms-defraud-investors-by-extracting-fees-from-their-portfolio-companies/

How the Greek Banks Secured an Additional, Hidden €41 billion Bailout from European taxpayers

"In 2013 Greek taxpayers borrowed from the rest of Europe’s taxpayers €41 billion to pump into the Greek banks. This is well known. What is not known is that, also in 2013/4, the Greek banks received an additional, well hidden, €41 billion bailout loan from Greek and European citizens. This bailout was never authorised by any Parliament or even discussed in public anywhere in Europe.

This is how it worked: Bank X would lend money to… itself. It would do this by issuing a bond which it did not intend to sell. So, why issue such a phantom bond? Why write an IOU and give it to one’s self? The answer is: In order to hand this phantom bond over to the European Central Bank as collateral in exchange for a cash loan. Normally, of course, the ECB would never accept such a phantom bond as collateral. Accepting it would have been to accept a loan it gave to Bank X as collateral for the said loan. It would have been an assault on the meaning of collateral and a gross violation of the ECB’s rulebook. So, bank X, knowing this, took its phantom bond first to the Greek government and had it guarantee it. With the government’s guarantee stamped on it, the ECB then accepted Bank X’s phantom bond and handed over the cash. Why? Because the Greek taxpayer had, in the meantime, unknowingly provided the collateral for Bank X’s loan."

http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2014/05/11/how-the-greek-banks-secured-an-additional-hidden-e41-billion-bailout-from-european-taxpayers/

Skąd rynek wiedział o szczegółach konstrukcji bomby termojądrowej?

"Trudno zrozumieć dlaczego historia o tym jak jeden z badaczy pracujących w latach 50. w Rand Corporation odgadł rodzaj paliwa użytego w konstrukcji drugiej generacji amerykańskich bomb termojądrowych, nie weszła do kanonu giełdowych anegdot.

Pod koniec 1953 roku Armen Alchian – ekonomista pracujący w Rand Corporation (stworzonym przez amerykański rząd think tanku) próbował dowiedzieć się jakie paliwo zostanie użyte w konstrukcji amerykańskiej bomby termojądrowej. Z oczywistych powodów, żaden ze współpracowników Alchiana z Rand Corporation, którzy dysponowali taką wiedzą, nie chciał przekazać mu tajnych informacji. Alchian dysponował spekulacyjnymi informacjami o tym, że rozważano użycie kilku substancji – litu, berylu, toru i kilku innych.

Z dostępnych publicznie źródeł Alchian zdobył wiedzę o największych producentach tych metali w USA. Sprawdził, które z tych spółek są notowane na giełdzie a następnie zbadał co działo się w ostatnim okresie z ich kursami. (...)"

http://blogi.bossa.pl/2014/05/14/skad-rynek-wiedzial-szczegolach-konstrukcji-bomby-termojadrowej/